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Abstract
This paper examines the skill segmentation of informal and formal labor markets.
A theoretical model is developed assuming that concealment of production is in-
creasingly costly in the informal sector. The results match the existent empirical
evidence, which indicates that informal ﬁrms employ a larger proportion of low
skilled workers than formal ﬁrms. Using data on the Brazilian informal economy
(PNAD-2005), an econometric analysis is presented to compare the plausibility of
our model with the one proposed by Fortin et al. (1997). The estimations indicate
that our model ﬁts the data better.
Resumo
O artigo examina a segmenta¸ c˜ ao entre o setor formal e informal dos mercados de tra-
balho. Um modelo te´ orico ´ e desenvolvido assumindo que o o custo de permancer no
setor informal ´ e crescente na produo. Os resultados do modelo est˜ ao em acordo com
a literatura emp´ ırica e indicam que ﬁrmas no setor informal empregam uma grande
propor¸ c˜ ao de trabalhadores desqualiﬁcados quando comparados com empresas no
setor formal. Usando dados da PNAD-2005 para a economia informal brasileira, os
resultados apontam que nosso modelo te´ orico explica melhor a realidade brasileira
quando comparados ao modelo apresentado em Fortin et al (1997).
JEL classiﬁcation: H26, J24, O17.
Keywords: informal sector, segmentation, labor skill, less developed countries.
1 Introduction
The informal sector represents a large proportion of the production activity in
less developed countries. Most societies attempt to control these activities through
punitive or educational measures rather than through reforms that could improve
the development of the formal economy. Shneider and Enste (2000) pose some causes
for the growth of the informal sector such as the rise of the burden of taxes and social
security contributions, increased regulation in the formal economy (e.g., reduction
of weekly working hours), earlier retirement, unemployment, and the decline of civic
virtue and loyalty toward public institutions combined with a declining tax morale.
1Formal and informal jobs diﬀer in several dimensions. While formal workers usu-
ally have access to some beneﬁts, individuals employed in the informal sector are
excluded from them. According to the model proposed by Rosen (1986), average
earnings should be higher in the less desirable informal sector to compensate for the
non-pecuniary beneﬁts granted to registered workers. That is, assuming that the
value of the beneﬁts is non-negative, direct payments in the informal sector should
be at least as high as those in the formal economy to oﬀset the lack of these ben-
eﬁts. Botelho and Ponczek (2007) conjecture that the cumbersome Brazilian labor
laws are the main reason for the rigidity in the labor market. Also, Maloney (2004)
considers informal work as a transitory phase for entrants in the labor market. Ac-
cording to this view, informal jobs may be a desirable alternative, providing more
ﬂexibility, and allowing both sides of the market to avoid cumbersome and expen-
sive regulations, and evade taxes. On the other hand, the recent literature on the
emergence of informal activities relies on the heterogeneity of ﬁrms or entrepreneurs
as the determinant factor (see Fortin, Marceau, and Savard (1997), thereafter cited
as “FMS”, Rauch (1991), Dessy and Pallage (2003), and Antunes and Cavalcanti
(2003)). In this literature, the informal sector endogenously emerges due to the pos-
sibility of evasion, which reduces the marginal cost of being informal. It is shown
that there is a segmentation in the scale of the ﬁrms and in wages, i.e., smaller ﬁrms
with lower wages operate in the informal sector.
Moreover, empirical studies indicate that there are remarkable diﬀerences be-
tween the formal and the informal labor markets. For example, Funkhouser (1996)
shows that the return to education in the informal sector is much lower than in the
formal sector and the male-female diﬀerential is much larger in the informal sec-
tor in ﬁve Central America countries. Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto (2002) ﬁnd that
illiterate individuals are highly penalized in the formal sector in Brazil. College
education is more advantageous in the formal sector, while the marginal beneﬁt of
elementary education is higher in the informal sector. The authors also argue that
there is a wage diﬀerential between formal and informal workers even after control-
ling for their characteristics, i.e., with workers in the formal sector earning a higher
return to education than informal workers. Indeed, several other papers discuss the
existence of this wage diﬀerential.1 The literature points out that the diﬀerence in
1See for instance Menezes-Filho et al. (2004), Carneiro and Henley (2001), and Funkhouser
2earnings between sectors are explained by non-observable characteristics of workers.
In addition, the wage diﬀerential may be compensated by the ineﬃcacy of labor
codes and/or low levels of human capital of workers in the informal sector.
In contrast with the previous literature, this paper attempts to analyze the
emergence of the informal sector focusing on the heterogeneity of workers rather
than ﬁrms. Thus, labor market considerations are incorporated into the analysis,
which relies on a simpliﬁed general equilibrium model that takes into account the
possibility of an informal sector, where ﬁrms do not pay taxes. Both formal and
informal ﬁrms, however, produce the same good. Regarding workers, individuals
may diﬀer in their skill (productivity) level, with each oﬀering one unit of labor.
As the key assumption, an informal ﬁrm faces an increasingly cost of concealing
production due to the need to hide production, in addition to the expected losses
due to ﬁnes, conﬁscation of products, halted production, etc. Then, the emergence
of informal activities happens due to evasion beneﬁts for ﬁrms, but diﬀerences in
private skill characteristics of workers and ﬁrms restricts the advantages of informal
operation for certain ﬁrms. Accordingly, an industry becomes segmented in terms
of evasion, but the segmentation depends on the type of workers required by the
industry. This distinguishes our model from FMS, where workers are homogeneous
in all characteristics. On the other hand, FMS also consider the eﬀects of an imposed
minimum wage rate in the formal sector, which is higher than the equilibrium wage
paid in the informal sector, while we obtain our results without wage diﬀerentiation
between the formal and the informal sectors (i.e., all workers obtain the same wage).
It is also interesting to notice that the results depend on the concealment cost
function. In particular, this function must be convex (the cost must get bigger at an
increasing rate) with respect to the ﬁrm’s production level. Facing an increasing cost
of concealment, it is only optimal for ﬁrms to operate in the informal sector when
the production level is low.2 Finally, competition guarantees that only proﬁtable
ﬁrms stay in the market in the long run. Consequently, FMS’s concealment cost
function, which depends on the number of employed workers, generates results that
are not well matched to the empirical evidence on labor skill segmentation mentioned
before. This happens because labor demand may not increase fast enough with labor
(1996).
2Empirical evidence of this segmentation exists. See Shneider and Enste (2000).
3productivity since wages also go up with productivity. Thus, high skilled labor could
be driven to the informal sector.
This paper also presents econometric exercises using data on the Brazilian in-
formal economy. This empirical analysis allow us to compare the plausibility of the
model in this paper relative to FMS’s model. Indeed, the results suggest that our
model ﬁts the data better. First, the probability that a higher skilled worker (when
education level is considered) is employed in the formal sector is greater, corroborat-
ing the results of previous studies. Second, controlling for individual characteristics,
it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that wages in the formal sector are similar
to wages in the informal sector (refuting the FMS’s assumption of the existence of a
wage diﬀerential between sectors). Finally, ﬁrms with the same number of workers
are observed in both sectors, which is not consistent with FMS’s model, where labor
demand increases with ﬁrm productivity. In contrast, our model allows the number
of workers to be the same in both sector because labor demand also depends on the
skill level of workers employed by the ﬁrm.3
The paper is organized as follows. The next Section presents the model and
analyzes the equilibrium distribution of workers between sectors for each level of
labor skill. Section 3 presents an empirical test to compare the plausibility of FMS’s
model with ours. Section 4 oﬀers concluding remarks.
2 The model: the case of costly production concealment
2.1 Setup
In this section, the model presented by FMS is modiﬁed to account for the fact
that each worker has a skill qualiﬁcation indexed by a scalar φ ≥ 0. As a simpli-
ﬁcation, however, each ﬁrm is skill speciﬁc, meaning that there is no substitution
between workers of diﬀerent labor skill levels. While the model assumes that all
ﬁrms produce the same good with price normalized to $1, ﬁrms that use workers
with higher skill obtain a greater production.4 A ﬁrm that requires high skilled
labor will be called a “high-φ” ﬁrm, while a ﬁrm that uses low skilled labor will be
3This feature is explicit in the modiﬁed version of the model presented in a previous version of
the paper.
4An alternative interpretation for this assumption is that ﬁrms using higher skilled workers
produce a greater valued product. In this case, however, demand for each product would have to
be perfectly elastic, so that relative prices are not aﬀected by changes in the supply of products.
4called “low-φ” ﬁrm. The set of ﬁrms that use the same type of labor skill will be
called an “industry” (thus, each industry is characterized by a diﬀerent labor skill
requirement).
According to their skill level, workers get a wage rate w(φ). The determination
of this wage function will not be studied here. However, one can interpret that
competition in the labor market makes the wage rate to equal the opportunity cost
incurred by a worker when supplying labor of quality φ. This cost includes learning
eﬀort (to obtain qualiﬁcation) and the opportunity of getting a lower skilled job. In
fact, we assume that wages increase with qualiﬁcation, i.e., w0(φ) > 0.
2.2 Sector choice by ﬁrms
In this paper, the term “formal sector” is used to refer to the portion of the econ-
omy characterized by ﬁrms binding to taxes and regulations vis-a-vis the “informal
sector” where ﬁrms do not fully pay taxes and/or follow regulations.
In this subsection, a model is developed to show that highly eﬃcient ﬁrms are
more proﬁtable in the formal sector, while less eﬃcient ﬁrms ﬁnd informal operation
more advantageous. This result is analogous to the one presented by FMS. How-
ever, our model uses two distinct assumptions. First, constant returns to scale in
ﬁrm-level production is adopted to simplify the analysis (in fact, additional results
arises, making the model encompassing). Second, ﬁrms in the informal sector face
an increasingly costly concealment of production (instead, FMS assumed that con-
cealment costs increase with the number of workers). This is a key assumption to
demonstrate (in the next subsection) that the proportion of employment by formal
ﬁrms is greater in industries that use higher labor skill. In contrast, if concealment
costs depend simply on the number of workers, then ﬁrms in high skill industries
may prefer to operate informally (this result is shown in a previous version of the
paper is available upon request).
Considering that ﬁrms are skill speciﬁc, the analysis in this subsection will be
restricted to a particular skill level φ. The eﬀects of changes in φ are analyzed in
the next subsection.
Note that the aggregate production of each industry exhibits decreasing returns
to scale due to the fact that ﬁrms in the industry are heterogeneous in their eﬃciency
level. In other words, some ﬁrms are better technologically than others, producing
5more with the same amount of labor. This heterogeneity may be due to diﬀerences in
management skill, knowledge of the market, or even historical factors. The eﬃciency
level of a ﬁrm is denoted by θ, which has an absolute frequency distribution g(θ,φ)
on [0, ¯ θ]. In order to simplify the analysis, it is assumed that each ﬁrm can hire only
one worker.5
When using labor skill φ, ﬁrm production is yf = θφ if in the formal sector.
Accordingly, proﬁt of a ﬁrm operating formally is
πf = (1 − τ)[θφ − (1 + t)w(φ)], (1)
where τ is the proﬁt tax rate and t is the labor tax rate. Note that (1) implies
that a ﬁrm in the formal sector only produces if θφ ≥ (1+t)w(φ), i.e., if proﬁtable.
By contrast, a ﬁrm in the informal sector produces yi = aθφ, with a < 1 being
parameter that represents the ineﬃciency inherent to informal operation (due to, for
example, diﬃculties in obtaining capital, technology, other inputs, regular buyers,
or ﬁnancial credit). Note that a allows us to compare the eﬀective revenue by a
ﬁrm in each sector (the term “eﬀective” will be used in this paper to refer to how
much ﬁrms actually obtain or pay after all taxes are imposed): a ﬁrm in the formal
sector ends up with (1−τ)θφ, while an informal ﬁrm gets aθφ. Besides the inherent
ineﬃciency, informal ﬁrms also incur a concealment cost c(yi), which is required to
prevent punishment from authorities. This cost exists only when the ﬁrm produces
a positive amount, increasing with production at a growing rate, i.e., c(0) = 0,
c0(.) > 0, and c00(.) > 0. Hence, the proﬁt of a ﬁrm in the informal sector is
πi = aθφ − w(φ) − c(aθφ). (2)
Thus, a ﬁrm in this sector only produces if aθφ ≥ w(φ) + c(aθφ).
Considering equations (1) and (2), a proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm with eﬃciency level
θ operates in the formal sector if
(1 − τ)θφ − (1 − τ)(1 + t)w(φ) ≥ aθφ − w(φ) − c(aθφ). (3)
Note that proﬁt increases with θ at a constant rate (1 − τ)φ in the formal sector,
5Instead of one worker per ﬁrm, the same setup can be used if each industry has a representative
producer with decreasing returns to scale, who would allocate labor to the sector that is marginally
more proﬁtable. On the empirical side, recent evidence on the Brazilian economy (from the PNAD















Figure 1: Potential ﬁrm proﬁt in each sector
while in the informal sector this rate is [1−c0(aθφ)]aφ. Because c0(.) is an increasing
function, the growth rate in the informal sector becomes eventually smaller than in
the formal sector. Thus, proﬁt in the formal sector eventually exceeds the potential
proﬁt in the informal sector (unless ¯ θ is not large enough, in which case all ﬁrms
would be in the informal sector). Leaving aside the cases where all ﬁrms operate
formally or informally for the moment, the result is the one depicted in Figure 1. In
the diagram, ˆ θ represents the threshold level of ﬁrm-eﬃciency such that only ﬁrms
above ˆ θ operate in the formal sector. In addition, note that the least eﬃcient ﬁrms
(i.e., ﬁrms with θ < ˜ θ in the Figure) are not proﬁtable, remaining inactive.
It is important to mention that the previous analysis supposes that low-θ ﬁrms
ﬁnd the informal sector more proﬁtable. It is possible that ﬁrms would never operate
in the informal sector: if the ineﬃciency inherent to informal operation is greater
than the tax burden in the formal sector, i.e., a < (1−τ), and the eﬀective labor cost
is greater in the informal sector, i.e., 1 ≥ (1−τ)(1+t), then informal operation yields
no advantage. These are suﬃcient, but not necessary conditions to have all ﬁrms
operating formally. For example, if c(.) grows very fast with production, then only
very low-θ ﬁrms may ﬁnd the informal sector advantageous, but these ﬁrms may be
unproﬁtable. The diagram in Figure 1 also implies that other possible equilibrium
cases exist. First, if the concealment cost does not grow relatively fast, ˆ θ would
be greater than ¯ θ, implying that all existent ﬁrms would be in the informal sector.
7Second, on contrary, if the concealment cost grows too quickly, then all ﬁrms would
be in the formal sector. Third, if the eﬀective labor cost is higher in the informal
sector, i.e., if 1 ≥ (1 − τ)(1 + t), then it is possible that the πi curve crosses the
πf curve twice, ﬁrst from below and then from above, implying that low and high-θ
ﬁrms are in the formal sector, but medium θ-ﬁrms operate in the informal sector.6
Since additional empirical evidence is needed to support the plausibility of these
equilibrium cases, the paper will continue focusing on the case where low-θ ﬁrms
operate informally and high-θ ﬁrms operate formally.
The following proposition summarizes the results derived in this subsection.
Proposition 1 Consider the following conditions:
(i) a ≥ (1 − τ),
(ii) 1 ≤ (1 − τ)(1 + t), and
(iii) c(aθφ) grows relatively fast with production.
While conditions (i) and (ii) imply that informal operation is advantageous for at
least the lowest-θ ﬁrms, condition (iii) guarantees that at least the highest-θ ﬁrms
will be formal. Therefore, if all conditions are satisﬁed, high-θ ﬁrms operate in
the formal sector, while informal operation is more advantageous to low-θ ﬁrms
(although these low-θ ﬁrms may be unproﬁtable).
In terms of government policies, note that the proportion of ﬁrms in the formal
sector increases with the degree that condition (iii) in Proposition 2 is satisﬁed
and the degree that conditions (i) and (ii) are not satisﬁed, holding everything else
constant. Therefore, informality is reduced with greater and more increasing c(aθφ)
on one hand, and smaller a, τ, or t on the other hand. In words, high tax rates and
low monitoring and punishment (which implies low a and high c(aθφ)) stimulates
informality.7
2.3 Labor skill segmentation
This subsection analyzes how ﬁrms’ choices between the formal and the informal
sector determine the distribution of workers between these sectors. In addition,
6In this case, it is also possible that, if the concealment cost grows slowly, only low-θ ﬁrms would
be in the formal sector.
7The eﬀect of a change in τ may seem ambiguous when looking at conditions (i) and (ii) in
Proposition 2, but recall that τ is the proﬁt tax rate, which reduces formal proﬁts when positive.
Thus, a greater τ constrains formality.
8changes in this distribution according to labor skill φ are studied.
In order to analyze labor demand by ﬁrms in the formal sector, recall that the
frequency distribution of θ is given by the function g(θ,φ) and each ﬁrm demands
only one worker. Hence, in a given industry of labor-type φ, ﬁrms with eﬃciency
level θ ≥ ˜ θ demand a total of g(θ,φ) workers (ﬁrms with θ ≤ ˜ θ are unproﬁtable, not
demanding any worker). Since all ﬁrms with θ ≥ ˆ θ operate in the formal sector, the
number of φ-type workers employed in the formal sector (denoted L
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˜ θ g(θ,φ)dθ. Because this proportion depends on the frequency distribution
g(θ,φ), it could increase or decrease with φ.8
In order to analyze how α is aﬀected by an increase in φ, ﬁrst notice that ˆ θ
decreases with φ if dπf
dφ > dπi








= [1 − c0(aˆ θφ)]aˆ θ − w0(φ). (6)
At ˆ θ, the slope of the πi curve (as depicted in Figure 1) is smaller than the slope of
the πf curve, which implies that [1 − c0(aˆ θφ)]a < (1 − τ). Thus, because labor pro-
ductivity signiﬁcantly increases concealment cost at ˆ θ, revenues after concealment
costs increase less in the informal sector than in the formal sector. On the other
hand, the eﬀective wage cost tend to increase proportionately more in the formal
sector (supposing that 1 ≤ (1−τ)(1+t)). Hence, potential proﬁt increases relatively
more in the formal sector if the concealment cost takes away a large part of the labor
productivity gain, i.e., if c0(aˆ θφ) is suﬃciently large relative to the tax rate τ, thus
compensating the increased wage cost advantage obtainable in the informal sector,
or if the wage cost advantage is very small (for example, if there was no diﬀerence in
eﬀective wage rates between sectors, then clearly proﬁt in the formal sector increases
8Even though the paper does not analyze the equilibrium in the labor market, it is assumed that
the wage rate w(φ) makes supply of each type of labor to exactly equal demand Lφ. Equilibrium
















Figure 2: Changes in ﬁrm proﬁt as φ increases
more).9 In this case, the changes in the proﬁt curves and the impact on ˆ θ can be de-
picted as in Figure 2. The decrease of ˆ θ results from the increase in ﬁrm production
due to higher labor skill, which makes the concealment cost of informal operation
larger, thus inducing more ﬁrms to become formal. Hence, a greater proportion of
high-φ ﬁrms are induced to operate in the formal sector compared to low-φ ﬁrms.
Considering the case where g(θ,φ) is constant with respect to φ, if ˆ θ decreases
with φ, then labor demand L
f
φ increases with φ (because ˆ θ is the inferior limit of
the integral in equation (4)). In addition, note that ˜ θ most probably increases with
φ because for low-θ ﬁrms the marginal productivity increase due to higher φ is very
small compared to the increased w(φ), reducing low-θ ﬁrms’s proﬁts. 10 Hence, α
increases with φ. In other words, the proportion of formal employment is larger
in high skill industries (i.e., among high skill workers). This result matches the
empirical evidence mentioned in the Introduction.
9Notice that the magnitude of the decrease in ˆ θ depends on the size of c
0(aˆ θφ). Because
c
00(aˆ θφ) > 0 and supposing that ˆ θ does not decrease proportionately more than the increase in
φ (which implies that hatθφ still increases), the marginal concealment cost c
0(aˆ θφ) increases with
φ, making it more likely that the change in proﬁt is greater in the formal sector.
10A decrease in ˜ θ would happen if the informal proﬁt for low-θ ﬁrms increases with φ. However,
this only occurs if the wage rate w(φ) is not very sensitive to changes in φ. For example, if wages
were the same regardless of skill, then higher labor skill increases proﬁts of all ﬁrms, making some of
the unproﬁtable ﬁrms to become proﬁtable. Because obtaining higher skill requires costly learning
by workers, it is not likely that the wage rate is invariant with skill.
10Nonetheless, a further analysis is required because the frequency distribution
g(θ,φ) probably varies with φ in reality. First, note that ﬁrm productivity θ is
determined in practice by capital use and technology (management or production
technology). Since it is plausible that there is complementarity between labor skill
and the amount of capital or technology used, then φ and θ are complements. Con-
sequently, high θ ﬁrms are more frequent in high-φ industries than in low-φ indus-
tries, i.e., g(θ,φ) becomes more skewed toward high-θs as φ increases (with ¯ θ being
probably greater in high-φ industries). According to equation (4), this change in
distribution implies that the proportion of formal employment tends to be higher in
high-φ industries even if ˆ θ or ˜ θ increased slightly compared to lower-φ industries.
Proposition 2 summarizes the results in this subsection.
Proposition 2 The proportion of formal employment is greater for high skilled
workers than for low skilled workers if g(θ,φ) is constant with respect to φ or becomes
more skewed toward higher θ values as φ increases, and (1−τ)ˆ θ−[1−c0(aˆ θφ)]aˆ θ >
[(1−τ)(1+t)−1]w0(φ), which requires that either c0(aˆ θφ) is large relative to the proﬁt
tax τ or the marginal increase in the eﬀective wage diﬀerential [1−(1−τ)(1+t)]w0(φ)
is relatively small.
As a ﬁnal remark, recall that Proposition 1 implied the theoretical possibility
that all ﬁrms operate in the informal sector. Proposition 2 indicates that this possi-
bility is greater for industries that require low labor skill because the threshold ˆ θ is
larger in this case, being possibly greater than the maximum existent ¯ θ. Intuitively,
holding everything else constant, labor skill increases the amount produced, making
it harder to conceal production. Hence, only industries that use low productive
labor can be completely informal.
3 Empirical Analysis
Using data on the Brazilian informal sector, this section presents an econometric
test of the plausibility of the theoretical model in this paper compared to FMS’s
model. One of the diﬀerences between the models is that FMS assumes w > wi,
where w corresponds to the minimum wage established by law and wi is the non-
regulated wage in the informal sector. In contrast, in the present paper, the wage
11rate is the same for workers with the same productivity regardless of the sector
where the ﬁrm operates. In addition, FMSs results does not allow for ﬁrms with
the same size in both sectors, while our model has no such restriction. The data
is also used to reassess the hypothesis that formal employment increases with labor
productivity.
3.1 Brazilian data on the informal sector
According to ENCIF 2003 (Informal Urban Economy Survey) elaborated by
the IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics), 88% of the informal
ﬁrms in Brazil are classiﬁed as self-employed. This survey estimates that there are
more than ten million informal ﬁrms in Brazil, mostly alocated in local commerce
and small services. This sector employs 69% of all informal workers. Hence, it is
essential to take the self-employed category into consideration when analyzing the
Brazilian informal economy. Because there are also a large amount of formal self-
employed workers, there is a coexistence of ﬁrms of the same size in both sectors.
This empirical fact poses doubt on FMS’s result that small ﬁrms operate in the
informal sector, while formal sector has larger ﬁrms.
Data from the PNAD (Brazilian National Household Survey, which uses a rep-
resentative population sample) is taken to test whether there is a diﬀerence between
wages obtained by formal and informal self-employed workers in 2005. Self-employed
workers represent ﬁrms that have only one employee.11 In particular, we control for
heterogeneous individual characteristics, focusing on the ﬁrms decision to operate
either in the formal or in the informal sector. Table 1 summarizes the data used.
These variables attempt to capture individual as well as geographic character-
istics. Concerning the ﬁrst aspect, the variable experience represents how long the
individual works as a self-employed, while age computes how old he/she is. Workers
educational level are measured by dummy variables that assume value one if the
individuals has concluded: elementary (4 years of schooling), secondary1(8 years
of schooling), secondary2 (11 years of schooling), fundamental(8 years of school-
ing), highschool (11 years of schooling) graduate (15 years of schooling) and also
by his/her years of schooling and the sum of family’s years of schooling (family
11The terms “ﬁrm” and “self-employed worker” are used indistinctly. The advantage of restrict-
ing the sample to self-employed workers is that it is only necessary to control the estimation for
individuals’ characteristics, since they represent the ﬁrms.
12Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
experience 7.713 9.929 0 80
age 36.328 14.175 10 102
bornmunic 0.511 0.500 0 1
years of schooling 8.443 4.496 1 16
activity 5.672 3.579 1 13
formal 0.469 0.499 0 1
family school years 3.666 1.458 1 6
ln(w) 2.733 2.386 -3.871 27.631
male 0.559 0.497 0 1
white 0.468 0.499 0 1
elementary 0.107 0.310 0 1
secondary1 0.019 0.138 0 1
secondary2 0.014 0.118 0 1
fundamental 0.297 0.457 0 1
highschool 0.244 0.430 0 1
graduate 0.097 0.296 0 1
otherincome 0.019 0.136 0 1
children 1.713 1.279 0 13
urbanarea 0.807 0.395 0 1
school years)12. The variables white and male are dummies that assume one if the
individual is white and male respectively. Last, the variables activity and formal,
denote whether the individual works in the local commerce and in the formal sector
respectively, while the variables otherincome and children represent how much the
family’s other member earn and how many children live with the worker. To cap-
ture geographic characteristics, the variables bornnmunic and urbanarea are dummy
variables that assume value equal to one if the individual was born in that munic-
ipality (to caputre his/her network) and if that municipality belongs to an urban
area.
3.2 Estimates
The empirical literature on wage diﬀerentials is extensive. 13 The main problem
of such approach found to estimate the wage diﬀerential is to determine whether the
decision of being formal or not is exogenous. In other words, one can say that a ﬁrm
that has lower proﬁts, may decide to not pay taxes and then become informal, or
12In Brazil, there were several changes in the educational levelss names. Depending on how old
is the individual, he/she can ﬁll out his/her educational achievements accordingly.
13See Leontaridi (1998).
13vice-versa, or , the fact that a worker is in the informal sector might depend on her
individual characteristics not observable by the researcher, i.e, the estimator can be
biased due to endogeneity problem.14
To address the endogeneity issue describe above, we use the propensity score
methodology. First, a probit estimation is run on the workers’ individual charac-
teristics to compute the probability of being formal versus informal. Then wages of
similar self-employed workers are compared by choosing observations in each group
(formal and informal) with similar propensity scores, i.e., only the observations with
similar predicted probit value.15. The propensity score (the conditional probabil-
ity of being formal) is a matching measure much simpler than conditioning on a
large dimensional vector of covariates, i.e., one has to consider only the predicted
probit value computed in the ﬁrst stage (one dimension) rather than the full set
of dependents (k-dimension) to compare the workers in the formal and informal
sectors.16
To implement this methodology, denote the comparison group for the formal
self-employed worker k with characteristics Xk as the set Hj(X) = {j/Xj ∈ c(Xk)},
where c(Xk) is the characteristics neighborhood of xk, i.e. those workers in the
formal sector that present their characteristics close (in terms of Euclidian distance)
to the individual k. Let NinfC denote the number of comparison group of informal
self-employed workers (worker whose characteristics are close to the individual k)
and let h(k,j) represent the weight given to the jth informal worker associated with
the kth formal worker, with
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where Nf is the number of formal workers, {formal} is the set of all formal self-
employed workers, wf,k is the wage of a formal worker k and winf,j is the wage of the
jth informal worker that belongs to the comparison group of the formal worker k.
14See Botelho and Ponczek (2007).
15For a more detailed explanation, see Cameron and Trivedi (2005) and Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983).
16See Deheijia Wahba (2002).
17This is a general formula for the ATET - average treatment eﬀect on the treated - estimator.
(See Cameron and Trivedi (2005), p. 863.)
14Note that 0 < h(k,j) ≤ 1. Diﬀerent matching estimators are generated by varying
the choice of h(k,j). We consider the nearest-neighbor matching, choosing for every
formal worker k the set Hj(p(X)) = {j/minλlp(Xk)−p(Xj)λl}, where p(X) denotes
the propensity score and λlp(Xk) − p(Xj)λl is the Euclidian distance between the
propensity scores of the formal kth self-employed worker and jth informal one. With
this measure, the “closest” informal individual is considered when comparing to the
formal self-employed worker. Table 2 presents the results of the ﬁrst stage probit
estimation,
Table 2: Formal sector entry probability (probit)























Note that the variables experience and age have the expected sign and signiﬁ-
cance. They indicate a concave function for the probability of entering the formal
sector (since the signs of agesquared and experiencesquared are negative). Thus,
higher age and experience increase the probability of having a formal ﬁrm, but at
some point that probability starts to decrease. Also as expected, the education
variables graduate (representing school graduation) and schoolyearsoﬀamily (sum
15of the years of schooling of other family members) increase the probability of be-
ing formal. This reinforces our theoretical model which suggest that higher skilled
workers tend to be employed in the formal sector. However, other sources of income
(otherincome) reduces the formality probability. The same happens when the num-
ber of children (variable children) increases. This suggests that these children might
contribute to the family’s income, which reinforces the eﬀect of otherincome.18
As mentioned before, the ﬁrst stage aims to ﬁnd what induces a self-employed to
enter the formal sector. Each individual is now attributed an estimated propensity
score. The next step is to compare the wages of formal and informal ﬁrms with
similar propensity scores. Table 3 summarizes the results.
Table 3: Dependent variable - ln (wages)
Sample Formal Controls Diﬀerence St. Err. t-stat.
Unmatched 3.268 2.352 0.916 0.093 9.830
ATT 3.268 3.057 0.211 0.214* 0.984
N 728 728
* Calculated using bootstrap technique.
The ﬁrst row of the table (Unmatched) presents the results of the comparison
when no ﬁrst stage is applied. In this case, observe that the diﬀerence in wages
is positive (0.916) and statistically signiﬁcant (t − stat = 9.83). However, after
the application of the correction method (ATT), see that the diﬀerence becomes
smaller (0.214) and statistically insigniﬁcant (t − stat = 0.984). This means that
formal and informal ﬁrms with one employee present the same wage, controlling
for heterogeneous but observables characteristics of the households. This result
corroborates the theoretical model presented in this paper, since it was argued that
there was no wage discrimination for ﬁrms with the same size and using the same
labor skill.
Even though the result is robust (low t − stat), it is worth to point out that
the potential future beneﬁts of being in the formal sector (such as social security or
pension funds) were ignored. Unfortunately, the data does not allow us to identify
how much is contributed to that end by each formal worker.19 Ideally, future beneﬁts
18The income contribution by children might be due to child labor in poor families in Brazil (see
Cardoso e Souza, 2005).
19The Brazilian law stipulates that the contribution rate to pension funds goes from 7.65% to
20%, but the exactly rate for each worker is not easily determinable with the data available.
16would be brought to present value and added to the observed wage. The next step
would be to test whether this “adjusted” wage obtained by formal workers is still
statistically equivalent to the associated informal wage. Considering that the self-
employed wage discriminated on the survey is the gross wage and noting that the Lei
Complementar 123 of 12/2006 (a federal regulatory bill) restricts how much each
formal self-employed can receive (a maximum that corresponds to approximately
to US$1,500), we proceed as follows. The minimum contribution rate (7.5%) is
discounted from the gross wage that the formal ﬁrm has to pay and the present
value of the maximum that each worker can receive is added. Thus, formal wage is
increased by 10% to 50% on average.20 Using a conservative approach, wages of all
formal self-employed workers were increased by 50%. The results of the estimation
with the adjusted wages are presented in Table 4.
Table 4: Dependent variable - ln (wages) - adjusted for future beneﬁts
Sample Formal Controls Diﬀerence St. Err. t-stat.
Unmatched 3.675 2.3882 1.286 0.093 9.830
ATT 3.675 3.232 0.443 0.254* 0.984
N 602 602
* Calculated using bootstrap technique.
The new estimates suggest that the results are robust to possible future payments
to the self-employed worker. This works as long as this beneﬁt does not go over 50%
of the wage in the formal sector.21
Therefore, there is no evidence that formal workers obtain higher wages relative
to informal workers.
4 Conclusion
Existent empirical evidence indicates that, compared to high skilled counter-
parts, low skilled workers are more predominant in smaller ﬁrms in the informal
economy. This paper studies the economic reasons for this empirical fact. This
analysis complements the model presented by FMS in the sense that heterogeneity
is now assumed to exist on the worker side rather than on the ﬁrm side. In the
20The average life expectancy in Brazil, 85 years old, is used to perform the calculation.
21For instance, if the formal wage is increased by 60%, then there is no longer statistical signif-
icance for the equality of wages between sectors. The corresponding estimation result is available
upon request.
17model, the allocation of low skilled workers to informal ﬁrms results from proﬁt
maximization decisions by ﬁrms, which can choose to operate in either sector (for-
mal or informal). The model shows that, in order to generate the result suggested
by empirical evidence, production (or some other variable highly correlated with
labor productivity) must be costly concealed in the informal sector. However, if the
concealment cost depends only on the number of workers (as assumed by FMS), the
results are ambiguous, meaning that low skilled workers could be more predominant
in the formal sector.
In addition, the paper presents an empirical analysis (using data on the Brazilian
informal economy) conﬁrming that more educated workers tend to be found in the
formal sector. The analysis also shows that workers with the same productivity
receive the same net wage regardless of the sector where they work. This evidence
corroborates the theoretical analysis, since this wage equality was assumed in theory.
By contrast, FMS considered that wages were regulated in the formal sector, being
higher than in the informal sector. The empirical analysis also shows that there
is no complete segmentation in terms of labor skill, meaning that there are ﬁrms
in both sectors using the same type of labor. Again, this is consistent with the
results of our theoretical model. Finally, data analysis indicate that there are ﬁrms
of the same size (regarding the number of workers) in both the formal and informal
sectors, which is inconsistent with the results found by FMS (in their model, small
ﬁrms operate in the informal sector, while larger ﬁrms operate in the formal sector).
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